A report, from cover to invoice

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gameonFictional exampleacme.example

Penetration test report

Acme Billing Ltd

Fictional company

Fictional example

Targets
api.acme.example, app.acme.example, jobs.acme.example
Test window
2 to 13 March 2026 (fictional dates)
Model
Pentest paid per validated flaw
Reference
BD-ACME-0001 (fictional)
Version
1.0

Confidential. Intended for Acme Billing Ltd (fictional).

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For management

Summary

Over ten business days, we tested Acme's billing API and web application from the outside, with three test accounts provided by your teams. Three flaws were confirmed and validated with you.

The most serious needs no account: an administration console is exposed on the Internet with its factory login. The other two let a signed-in user become administrator of their organisation, and read other customers' invoices. No real data was copied, and the internal network was not touched.

Validated flaws

  • 0Low
  • 1Medium
  • 1High
  • 1Critical

Fix in this order

  1. 1Take the administration console off the Internet (BD-01), then renew the token it exposes.
  2. 2Filter the fields a profile update may change (BD-02).
  3. 3Check the owner of every invoice requested (BD-03).

What held

  • Login attempt limiting and account lockout withstood our tests.
  • Access tokens expire and cannot be replayed after sign-out.
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Method

What was tested

Tested

  • Billing API, current version and the /v1 version
  • Web application: customer area with reader, manager and administrator roles
  • Authentication and password reset
  • Object-by-object and function-by-function access control
  • Services exposed on the addresses declared in the authorisation

Out of scope, not tested

  • Internal network
  • Mobile application
  • Denial of service, phishing, physical intrusion

Rules applied

  • Source IP addresses declared before the window: 203.0.113.0/24 (documentation range)
  • Minimal proof: no real customer data was copied
  • Stop and report on sensitive data: not triggered

Observation not retained, not invoiced

HTTP security headers missing on the marketing site. With no demonstrated impact, this observation is not part of the grid.

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BD-01

Critical9.8

Task queue admin console exposed with its factory login

Asset
jobs.acme.example
CVSS 3.1 vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Status
Validated by Acme Billing (fictional)

Reproduction

  1. 1Reconnaissance of Acme's addresses reveals a subdomain answering with the login page of a task queue monitoring tool.
  2. 2That tool ships with a default administrator account, publicly documented by its vendor. Signing in with it is accepted.
  3. 3The console lists the queues, retries or deletes tasks and reads their parameters, which contain customer e-mail addresses and a service token. We read a single task, changed nothing, and stopped.

Impact

An attacker with no account can read customer data, disrupt billing jobs and reuse the service token found in the parameters.

Recommended fix

Take the console off the Internet or put it behind authenticated remote access. Replace the factory password, renew the exposed service token, and add the tool to the inventory of public services.

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BD-02

High8.8

Privilege escalation through mass assignment on the user profile

Asset
api.acme.example
CVSS 3.1 vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Status
Validated by Acme Billing (fictional)

Reproduction

  1. 1With a reader-role test account, we send the usual profile update, then the same request with the field that carries the role added.
  2. 2The server stores that field without filtering it. The response shows the administrator role for the test account.
  3. 3Reopening the application with that account, the organisation's admin screens are reachable. We changed no organisation data.

Impact

Any signed-in user, even the least privileged, becomes administrator of their organisation: user management, API keys and billing settings.

Recommended fix

List explicitly the fields a user may change and ignore all others. Write the role only from an administration action, checked on the server. Add an automated test that tries to send that field.

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BD-03

Medium6.5

Reading other customers' invoices by changing an identifier (IDOR)

Asset
api.acme.example
CVSS 3.1 vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Status
Validated by Acme Billing (fictional)

Reproduction

  1. 1With test account A, we open one of its invoices and note the identifier in the address called.
  2. 2With the same token, we request the neighbouring identifier, which belongs to test account B. The response contains the full invoice.
  3. 3Identifiers are sequential: enumeration is trivial. We read three invoices from accounts we controlled, and none from a real customer.

Impact

Any authenticated user can read any other customer's invoices by enumerating identifiers: names, addresses and amounts.

Recommended fix

Check on the server that the requested invoice belongs to the token's account, and refuse otherwise. Use non-sequential identifiers as a complement, not a replacement.

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Billing

Invoice

Profile applied

50 to 249 people, nationally known brand, user accounts and personal data. Grid multiplier: 1.25

Ref.FlawSeverityScoreAmount
BD-01Task queue admin console exposed with its factory loginCritical9.8€8,300
BD-02Privilege escalation through mass assignment on the user profileHigh8.8€3,000
BD-03Reading other customers' invoices by changing an identifier (IDOR)Medium6.5€1,000
Total due€12,300

Grid applied to this profile

SeverityMinimumMaximum
Low€150€300
Medium€400€1,100
High€1,300€3,100
Critical€3,800€9,400

Mission cap in the contract (30 days, adjustable, example)

€15,000

Reached: no

Payment within 30 days. Only validated flaws are invoiced. The grid is frozen in the contract before the test window.

Sample invoice, without value. Amounts in euros; VAT is not shown in this example.

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